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Resumen
Este artículo analiza el rol de la inversión directa extranjera (IDE) en el crecimiento económico y,
basado en estos resultados, discute si  hay alguna racionalidad para  políticas especiales  que
discriminan en favor de sectores particulares  para atraer IDE  y promover el crecimiento.  En el
ámbito sectorial, este trabajo también discute el rol de los recursos naturales sobre el crecimiento
económico.  Además se cuestiona la visión que tener recursos naturales e s  negativo  para el
crecimiento y el bienestar.
Abstract
This paper analyzes the role of FDI on economic growth, and discusses whether, based on these
results, there is some rationale for special policies that discriminate in favor of particular sectors to
attract FDI and to promote growth.  At a sectoral level, this paper also discusses the role of natural
resources on economic growth.  The view that having natural resources is bad for growth and
welfare is questioned.
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           Introduction
Foreign direct investment (FDI) has long been a topic high on the policy agenda
in emerging markets. The contribution of FDI to a country’s external financing and
economic growth, the behavior of multinational corporations, and the extent of regulation
of FDI and other forms of capital flows are some of the issues on which policymakers
usually have to take a stand. Not coincidentally, economic research has devoted a large
effort to exploring these issues.
In this paper I discuss some of the issues regarding FDI in developing countries,
and in particular two issues highlighted in recent discussions and research. The first is
whether and through which channels FDI affects economic growth. The second is the
impact on economic growth of the exploitation of natural resources, normally developed
by foreign investors. The two questions are related, and from the answers we can derive
policy implications regarding the treatment of FDI in developing countries.
I begin by reviewing some stylized facts about the behavior of FDI, especially in
the years since the surge of capital inflows of the 1990s came to a halt. Next I discuss the
evidence showing that FDI does affect economic growth and the mechanisms through
which that occurs. I then discuss the relationship between the exploitation of natural
resources, in which foreign investors often play an important role, and economic growth.
The paper ends with some concluding remarks.2
1. Some Stylized Facts
Figure 1 summarizes the recent history of capital inflows to emerging markets.
The late 1970s and early 1980s witnessed a surge of capital flows, but this primarily took
the form of debt. During the second half of the 1980s, after the debt crisis that began in
Latin America in the early 1980s, capital flows to emerging markets almost evaporated.
The early 1990s, however, saw a reversal of this trend: a renewed and even stronger
upsurge occurred during that decade, reaching a peak on the eve of the Asian crisis.
Interestingly, this process has its mirror image in the current account of the United States.
The U.S. current account shifted gradually from near balance in the early 1980s to a
deficit of about 3 percent of GDP by 1988. It had fallen to almost zero again by 1991, but
since then it has been increasing steadily, to almost 5 percent of GDP in 2002. This
shows that although capital flows respond to opportunities created in emerging markets,
they also move according to the availability of capital in the developed world.
The latter part of the 1990s saw another sharp decline of capital flows to emerging
markets. From more than $300 billion in 1996, inflows have declined to little more than
half that magnitude in recent years. But another important dimension of the capital flows
slowdown has been a change in composition. Even as portfolio equity flows and debt
have declined, FDI has remained substantial, and well above pre-1996 levels. Whereas
before 1990, emerging economies received only 13 percent of worldwide FDI in a typical
year (figure 2), by 1996 that share had more than doubled. Emerging economies in Asia
claimed the bulk of these increased flows, but their share declined again after the Asian
crisis of the late 1990s. Latin America meanwhile has kept its share of worldwide FDI
relatively constant.
As figure 3 shows, however, even as total capital flows to Latin America have
declined, the importance of FDI within those flows has increased. Indeed, in all of the
world’s emerging regions, but especially in Latin America, the relative importance of
FDI in capital inflows has been increasing, from about 10 percent of total inflows in the
early 1990s to 35 percent in 2002 (figure 4). Today it is widely taken for granted that FDI
will be the main, and indeed almost only, vehicle of foreign financing in developing
countries for years to come.3
The mid-1990s surge in FDI to emerging economies largely took the form of
greenfield investment, that is, the construction of new foreign-owned facilities. Much
FDI in recent years, however, has come in response to privatization and, more generally,
to opportunities for mergers and acquisitions generated by lower asset prices in these
economies. In this respect, capital flows in the developing world have come to resemble
those among developed countries, where more than 80 percent of flows of FDI take the
form of mergers and acquisitions.
1 As figure 5 shows, the share of mergers and
acquisitions in FDI inflows into Latin America rose from about 20 percent in the early
1990s to about 50 percent in 2000.
An important and frequently cited feature of FDI is that it tends to be relatively
stable: when a crisis erupts, FDI cannot flee the country as easily as more liquid forms of
capital such as portfolio flows and debt. In times of turbulence, these more liquid flows
may increase the volatility of the capital account, with adverse consequences for
exchange rates and economic activity. In a sense, foreign direct investors share more in
the risks of the domestic economy, as the prices of their assets adjust to local economic
conditions. A simple way to illustrate this point is to examine the persistence of different
flows by estimating the autocorrelation coefficient for a series of annual flows. Table 1
shows this coefficient, with one and two lags, for annual data from 1978 to 2000. The
table shows that FDI tends to be more persistent than other types of flows, and especially
persistent in Latin America. This evidence suggests that those countries that are able to
attract FDI can expect to see these inflows continue; on the other hand, should FDI stop
flowing in, the drought may last a long time.
It is well established, and will be discussed later, that countries with a history of
strong growth performance are able to attract FDI. This might lead to think, given the
evidence reviewed above, that FDI into the Latin American economies has increased
because these economies are performing well. However, this is clearly not the case. Here
it is important to recognize that FDI is almost the only form of capital still flowing to the
region. Recently, Haussman and Fernández-Arias (2000) have presented convincing
evidence against the view that FDI dominates capital inflows in countries that are more
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promising, safer, and have better institutions and policies. Figure 6 shows that those
countries whose inflows consist mainly of FDI tend to be countries with lower
creditworthiness. Countries classified by Moody’s as B and Ba receive almost 70 percent
of their capital inflows as FDI, whereas for investment-grade countries that figure is
between 30 and 40 percent. These data confirm that although countries with better
performance receive more capital inflows, these inflows are less tilted toward FDI than in
economies with poorer performance. The recent trends in Latin American countries’
capital accounts confirm that, as risk and instability have increased in some important
parts of the region, FDI has become their most important source of external financing.
At the firm level, Desai, Foley, and Hines (2002) show that the existence of
capital controls distort the allocation of assets by American multinational corporations.
These companies overinvest in physical capital in countries with capital controls and
underinvest in financial assets. Because multinational corporations enjoy access to world
capital markets, they have an advantage over purely domestic firms in investing in
activities that are capital intensive. This may explain why, in less developed economies
and in economies less fully integrated into the world economy, there is a bias toward FDI
with respect to other forms of capital.
2. The Effects of FDI on Economic Growth
The accumulation of capital is an important determinant of economic growth.
Since FDI is a component of total investment, it, too, contributes to growth. But the
interesting question is whether FDI exerts a positive growth effect beyond the direct
effect through increased investment, for example because it facilitates the transfer of
knowledge from abroad. Addressing this issue from both an analytical and an empirical
point of view may lead to important policy implications: if FDI does foster growth
beyond its simple contribution to capital accumulation, policymakers may wish to give
special consideration to policies that promote the inflow of FDI.5
There are many reasons why FDI might give rise to beneficial externalities that
promote economic growth. FDI may allow a country to bring in technologies and
knowledge that are not readily available to domestic investors, and in this way increase
productivity growth throughout the economy. FDI may also bring in expertise that the
country does not possess, and foreign investors may have better access to global markets.
Indeed, De Gregorio (1992) found support for this view by examining the evidence on
economic growth in Latin America during the period 1950-85: increasing aggregate
investment by 1 percentage point of GDP was found to increase economic growth by 0.1
to 0.2 percent a year, but increasing FDI by the same amount increased growth by
approximately 0.6 percent a year. This indicates that FDI is about three times more
efficient than domestic investment.
Along similar lines, and for a broader sample of countries, Blomstrom, Lipsey,
and Zejan (1992) found that FDI has a positive effect on growth under certain
circumstances. Comparing samples of low- and high-income countries, they found a
positive effect of FDI only in the second group, suggesting that there is a threshold level
of income above which FDI has extra effects on economic growth, and below which it
does not.
The study by Blomstrom, Lipsey, and Zejan is consistent with the idea that only
those countries that have reached a certain level of income can absorb new technologies
and benefit from technological diffusion, and thus reap the extra advantages that FDI can
offer. What explains this differential response to FDI at different levels of income? The
prime suspect is human capital, a variable that is positively correlated with the level of
income per capita. It may take a well-educated population to spread the benefits of newly
introduced technologies to the whole economy.
This was the idea explored by Borensztein, De Gregorio, and Lee (1998), who
analyzed the growth effect of FDI in a panel data set of 69 developing countries during
the period 1970-89. In an initial analysis, FDI was found to have a positive effect on
growth beyond the direct investment effect, but not in general a statistically significant
effect. However, when the authors constructed a new variable–the FDI variable
multiplied by a measure of human capital—the effect turned out to be both positive and6
significant. This finding showed that the interaction of FDI and human capital had an
important impact on growth. But this effect was observed only when the level of human
capital, as measured by years of secondary school enrollment of the male population, was
sufficiently high. The intuition behind this result is that, for a country to take advantage
of technological diffusion due to FDI, it must have a high level of human capital. For
example, a permanent increase in FDI equivalent to 1 percent of GDP, in a country with
an average educational attainment of 0.91 years of secondary schooling (the average in
the sample), would increase the rate of growth by 0.6 percent a year. More recently,
Balasubramanyan, Salisu, and Sapsford (1999) have confirmed the positive interaction
between human capital and FDI. They also found that more-open economies experience
greater benefits from FDI.
However, the evidence just reviewed appears at odds with some recent
microeconomic evidence. In an important paper, Aitken and Harrison (1999) studied the
spillover effects of foreign firms on domestic firms in Venezuela and found very limited
effects at the plant level. Moreover, the small spillover they found came mainly from
joint ventures, suggesting that close ties between domestic entrepreneurs and foreign
investors generate some spillovers, but that purely foreign plants do not. This evidence is
interesting and persuasive, but by its nature it cannot capture spillovers from foreign
investors to the whole economy. For example, if foreign investors in manufacturing
somehow induced productivity improvements in, say, the financial sector, this would not
be captured at the plant level. However, it should be captured at the aggregate level,
which may require looking at cross-country evidence.
Given these mixed results, Carkovic and Levine (2002) recently took another look
at the effects of FDI on economic growth in a large sample of countries. Previous studies
had tackled the endogeneity issue, that is, whether the observed positive effect is due to
the fact that fast-growing countries are the ones best able to attract foreign investors, but
these authors argued that their procedures were more robust to the endogeneity problem.
After using a battery of tests and techniques to control for these problems, they concluded
that growth and a good macroeconomic environment are what drive FDI, rather than the
other way around.7
The existence of a positive externality from FDI to economic growth remains an
unsettled issue, and therefore the policy implications are not straightforward. However,
even if there is a positive externality, as most cross-country studies indicate, the
implication that there should be special policies to foster foreign investment does not
necessarily follow. My own presumption is that a number of issues call into question the
case for special incentives. Indeed, in order to justify special incentives, it is necessary
not only to prove that FDI has a positive effect on growth, but also that it is possible to
identify policies that promote FDI without inducing distortions that may offset the gains
in growth. What is really needed to support a policy of special incentives for FDI is
empirical evidence of a positive relationship between discriminatory policies in favor of
FDI and economic growth.
There are several important reasons to be cautious when considering policies that
discriminate in favor of foreigners:
•  Discriminatory policies open the door to rent seeking and economic
distortions. They create a perverse incentive for domestic investors to seek out
foreigners with whom to share the potential subsidies, even when foreigners would
not be interested in investing if there were no special treatment. Such policies also
reduce incentives for local entrepreneurship. In summary, discrimination induces
other distortions in the economy.
•  Special treatment for some projects or sectors may reduce the net benefits
from FDI. In attempting to foster particular sectors or specific investment projects,
authorities may negotiate, on a case-by-case basis, special conditions for foreign
investors. This is risky business. In a competitive world, if many countries bid against
each other to attract the same foreign investment, they may end up dissipating all the
potential gains from such investment.
•  Direct incentives to foreign investors generate unfair discrimination
between domestic and foreign investors, and this raises serious political economy
implications, especially in middle-income countries. Some affected groups will ask
why foreigners should enjoy better treatment than domestic investors. One possible
answer is that, until the country has built strong institutions and a reputation as a safe8
location for foreigners to do business, some form of discrimination may be advisable.
For example, the country may need to offer some specific guarantees in terms of
protection of property rights and rules of the game.
This has been the route followed by Chile in its efforts to sustain inflows of FDI.
Under the 1974 Foreign Investment Statute (DL 600), later made part of the Constitution
of 1980, foreign investors can sign a contract with the State of Chile guaranteeing them
property rights and some stability of the rules of the game.
2 Foreign investors accounting
for 85 percent of total FDI inflows into Chile since 1974 have taken advantage of this
mechanism.
The principal rules promoting stability are those ensuring full access to foreign
exchange, something that traditionally has been heavily restricted in Chile. Foreign
investors may also apply for a guarantee of tax invariability, although they will pay a
higher tax rate than that currently imposed on profit remittances. These rules were
applied in a period of great uncertainty about protection of property rights and stability of
the rules of the game. This is also reasonable in the context of a country that until
recently imposed many restrictions on the foreign exchange market.
However, there is no reason for Chile to go further in this direction, especially
now that it has established its reputation and commitment to fair treatment of foreign
investors on the basis of equal treatment to national and foreigners. Hence, if anything,
the special rules applying to foreigners should be dismantled as time goes on. Only those
rules that relate to the essence of being a foreign investor, such as those governing access
to foreign exchange, should be kept in place.
3. The Effects of Natural Resources on Economic Growth
Proposals aimed at attracting foreign investment often seek to promote certain
specific sectors rather than others. In particular, there is a current debate on whether the
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exploitation of natural resources is good for growth.  This is a particularly important issue
for a country like Chile, where more than a third of foreign investment has been directed
to the mining sector. But it is an important topic for all countries interested in FDI. The
role of natural resources in economic development touches on many issues, from FDI to
the environment to the level and management of exchange rates. The issue I will address
here is the fundamental one of whether natural resources are a blessing or a curse for
developing countries.
Recent empirical research has found a negative relationship between abundance
of natural resources and economic growth. Most notably, Sachs and Warner (1995) found
such a negative relationship using cross-country regressions. Their finding was robust to
different measures of resource abundance, such as the share of mining production in
GDP, land per capita, and the share of natural resource exports in GDP. They found that a
one-standard-deviation increase in the share of natural resources exports in GDP was
associated with a lower rate of growth on the order of 1 percent a year.
The claimed robustness of this finding has been subjected to severe scrutiny. For
example, it has been noted that certain high-income countries, such as Finland and
Sweden, Canada and the United States, and Australia, still rely on their abundance of
natural resources, and thus provide some strong historical counterexamples. Lederman
and Maloney (2002) reexamined the econometric analysis of Sachs and Warner (both
their original 1995 paper and subsequent papers) and argued that, after controlling for
omitted variables and endogeneity problems, their finding does not hold. What Sachs and
Warner’s natural resources variables were really capturing, according to Lederman and
Maloney, was the negative correlation between export concentration and interindustry
trade, and the positive correlation between such concentration and real exchange rate
volatility.
Although the empirical evidence may thus be inconclusive, as it was in the case of
FDI, it is useful to review the channels through which having natural resources might be
detrimental for growth, and what might be the policy implications. There are two
interesting hypotheses. The first, formalized by Lane and Tornell (1996), is rooted in
political economy and invokes a “voracity effect.” Different interest groups, it is argued,10
fight to capture the rents from natural resources, and this induces a bad allocation of
resources, tilted toward rent seeking and inducing inefficient taxation. The other
hypothesis is that an economy may have a limited endowment of some key factor, for
example the capital stock. In such a situation, the exploitation of natural resources, which
provides high rents but probably makes a small contribution to overall productivity
growth, may also shift the allocation of capital away from growth-enhancing activities.
If the problems with natural resources development stem from a voracity effect,
the solution is not to forbid their exploitation but rather to strengthen institutions. After
all, there will always be some source of rents, but a healthy institutional framework, one
that leads to sound fiscal policy, taxation, regulation, and decision making at the
government level, may prevent the capture of economic policy by interest groups that do
not properly represent the interests of society. In contrast, if the problem is that the
exploitation of natural resources uses scarce resources, such as physical capital, then the
first-best solution may be to open the capital account and allow FDI in the natural
resources sector. In a world of free capital mobility, the lack of domestic capital could be
overcome by allowing in foreign capital.
However, as argued by Bravo-Ortega and De Gregorio (2002), if the scarce factor
is human capital, opening does not solve the problem, because human capital is much less
mobile across countries. This is shown using a two-sector model. It is assumed that
production in one sector, natural resources, is subject to decreasing returns to scale,
whereas the other sector, manufacturing, is subject to decreasing returns to scale at the
firm level, but there is an externality that leads to aggregate constant returns to scale and,
thus, to permanent growth. The rate of growth of the economy is a weighted average of
the rates of growth of the two sectors. If the economy has a high level of human capital,
the higher income that it attains generates faster growth despite the abundance of natural
resources. This model captures the idea that natural resources limit growth as long as the
level of human capital is low, leaving insufficient resources to devote to growth-
enhancing activities. The implication of the model is that countries with low levels of
human capital may reduce their rate of growth by exploiting natural resources. Indeed,
the empirical evidence presented in the paper shows that there is an interaction effect11
between human capital and the abundance of natural resources, and that there is a
threshold level of human capital beyond which natural resources are good for growth.
Nevertheless, this discussion misses the most important point: what is good for an
economy’s welfare is not necessarily its rate of growth of output, but rather the level of
output. It is easy to imagine an economy where the discovery of natural resources may
lead to a decline in growth but an increase in income that ultimately raises welfare. On
the other hand, it is difficult to imagine that a country could be better off by giving away
its natural resources as could be wrongly implied from the result of Sachs and Werner
(1995). The empirical evidence regarding the level of income, rather than the rate of
growth, shows that the richer a country is in natural resources, the greater its income.
Maloney (2002) has made a similar point regarding the innovative capacity of a
country and the benefits it can extract from the exploitation of natural resources.
Reviewing the historical evidence, he argues that high investment in human capital and
scientific infrastructure helps countries both take greater advantage of technological
advances abroad and increase productivity growth in the natural resources sector.
Maloney also argues that there is no reason to think that natural resource industries have
inherently slower productivity growth than other sectors such as industry.
The high starting levels of human capital in the Scandinavian countries and in
other high-income countries with a broad base of natural resources help to explain why
the exploitation of those resources was not detrimental for their growth. Moreover, even
the argument that natural resources industries display slow productivity growth compared
with manufacturing has been recently questioned by Martin and Mitra (2001). They
found, in a large sample of developing and developed countries, that technical progress
has been faster in agriculture than in manufacturing, weakening further the argument that
governments should use discriminatory policy to shift the economy from natural
resources to industry. As in the case of FDI, there is strong evidence that having a well-
educated labor force is key to growth and, specifically, key to taking full advantage of
both FDI and natural resources.12
4. Concluding Remarks
Foreign direct investment is beneficial for economic growth. But there is no solid
basis for arguing that any one sector should be promoted against any other, and therefore,
as a general guideline, inducements to FDI should not be made on a discriminatory
sectoral basis without some clear rationale. The issue of industrial policy goes beyond the
purpose of this paper, but there are no strong reasons to argue that developing natural
resources rather than manufacturing may be detrimental for growth. However, as this
paper has emphasized, taking full advantage of the benefits of FDI requires a well-
educated labor force, to promote technological diffusion and the adoption of better
technologies. The same applies to the development of natural resources: here, too, it is
beneficial to have a high level of human capital. This prevents crowding out among
different activities. It allows for innovation to take place, starting in the natural resources
sector and spreading downstream or to other sectors. The experience of the Nordic
countries shows how prosperity is in no way inconsistent with the good fortune of being
well endowed in natural resources.
Also important is the principle of national treatment. There is no reason for
countries to discriminate between local and foreign investors, and perhaps one of the
most important rules for all countries is that foreigners should be treated as locals.
However, in countries making the transition toward being a reputable recipient of FDI, it
may be necessary to provide some guarantees to foreigners, in particular those that apply
uniquely to foreign investors, such as access to foreign exchange to remit profits and
capital.
As countries develop, it is to be expected that capital flows will take different
forms, and perhaps the share, although not the magnitude, of FDI may decline. For this
reason, policymakers must look at FDI in the broad context of capital flows and realize
that trying to force these flows to take one form or another may create artificial
distortions. Of course, and for good reasons, countries may worry about the maturity of
capital inflows and FDI, but this does not imply that, for flows of a given maturity, there
should be some preference for one form over another. Each type of capital inflows serves
a different purpose from the point of view of investors, and the choice depends to a large13
extent on the institutional framework of the economy.  In addition, if the concerns are
with the stability of the economy and capital flows, the best instrument is a strong system
of prudential regulation of the financial system.
An economy with strong institutions and protection of property rights is the best
incentive for FDI. A recent World Bank survey of 191 multinational corporations,
including 30 of the world’s 100 biggest, found that almost 80 percent planned to expand
abroad in order to create new operations or to buy existing companies (table 2). These
companies use FDI mainly to gain access to markets. This would put small developing
countries at a disadvantage in attracting FDI. But with greater openness, and progress in
transportation and communications, this disadvantage could be overcome, since the
second most important reason for locating abroad is to reduce costs.
As the survey also shows (table 3), what matters for the choice of location is not
special incentives (for example, lower taxes is not among the most important factors), but
rather strength of institutions. Access to customers is naturally the most important factor
of all. But the stability of the social and political environment and ease of doing business
follow close behind. Countries can benefit greatly from FDI. To attract it, and to take full
advantage of it when it comes, growth-promoting institutions are the essential ingredient.
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Debt, Bonds and other flows 0.56 0.24
Official Creditors -0.31 -0.3
Emerging Asia ex China and India
FDI 0.87 0.66
Portfolio 0.52 0.27
Debt, Bonds and other flows 0.61 0.03
Official Creditors 0.32 -0.13
Source: Author’s calculations17
Table 2: World Bank Foreign Direct Investment Survey:
expansion strategies
Locating new facilities outside home country
in next 3 years (%)
yes 79
no 21
Expansion strategy in foreign country
Expand an existing company facility 15
Build or lease a facility 43
M&A 42
Source: World Bank (2002)
Table 3: World Bank Foreign Direct Investment Survey:
Factors Influencing Location
First and Second most important objective for investing abroad
1st 2nd
Improved market access 55 15
Reduce operating costs 17 31
Other factors 8 11
Source raw materials 6 0
Consolidate operations 4 16
Developed new product lines 4 11
Improved productivity 2 0
Developed new technologies 2 0
Improved labor force access 1 11
Reduce risk 1 5
Source: World Bank (2002)18
Figure 1: Net Capital Flows to Emerging Markets
(billions of 2000 dollars)
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Figure 2: FDI inflows distribution, 1979-2000
(percentage)
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Figure 3: Net Capital Flows to Latin America
(billions of 2000 dollars)
Source: Institute of International Finance
f: Forecast
Figure 4: Share of FDI on Net Capital Inflows by Region
(percentage)
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Figure 5: Share of Mergers and Acquisitions in FDI Inflows
(percentage)
Source: UNCTAD (1999, 2001)
Figure 6: Share of FDI in Total Capital Inflows by Credit Rating
(percentage)
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